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INTRODUCTION

In Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products,'
the Supreme Court noted that restricting the enforcement of patent
rights to only those cases where the patent was literally infringed
"would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be
subordinating substance to form."2 To avoid this unjust result, the
Court applied the doctrine of equivalents to find infringement
where the differences between the claimed and the accused
products or processes were insubstantial.'
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, however, has
been often criticized for introducing an element of uncertainty in
determining whether infringement has occurred. The Federal
Circuit responded to these criticisms in Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.4 The court affirmed en banc a jury
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and
attempted to resolve the ongoing debate concerning the legitimacy
of the broad application of that doctrine.5 Because these issues
were important to both industry and patent law practitioners, the
court invited members of these groups6 to submit briefs regarding

1. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
2. Id. at 607.
3. Id. at 610.
4. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (per curiam), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014
(1996).
5. Id. at 1515.
6. The American Intellectual Property Law Association, Stanley L. Amberg,
Acuson Corp., the Federal Circuit Bar Association, the American Bar Association,
the Iowa State Bar Association, the California Association for the Advancement
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whether a judge or a jury should determine infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents and then how that judge or jury should
apply the doctrine. 7 The complexity of the issues and the significance of the answers to these questions were evidenced by the
panel's seven-to-five split and by the lengths of the thoughtful
concurring and dissenting opinions. On February 26, 1996, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the
divergent opinions.9
Contrary to the patent community's expectations that the court
would limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents, the
Federal Circuit directed a return to a body of case law which
favored patentees.'" Although the court asserted that its holding
merely restated the test for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents," the impact of its decision will likely be enormous.
The ruling will generate significant criticism because it further
increases the inherent uncertainty of the application of the doctrine
of equivalents. The Hilton Davis decision, however, is probably
welcome to those who practice law in nations such as Germany
and Japan because it further aligns patent practice in the United

of Technology and Invention, the Houston Intellectual Property Law Association,
and the Intellectual Property Law Institute filed amicus curiae briefs. Id. at 1514.
7. Specifically, the court asked the parties to brief the following questions:
1. Does a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
require anything in addition to proof of the facts that there are the same
or substantially the same (a) function, (b) way, and (c) result, the socalled triple identity test of Graver Tank. . . ? If yes, what?
2. Is the issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents an
equitable remedy to be decided by the court, or is it, like literal
infringement, an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury case?
3. Is application of the doctrine of equivalents by the trial court to
find infringement of the patentee's right to exclude, when there is no
literal infringement of the claim, discretionary in accordance with the
circumstances of the case?
Id. at 1516.
8. Id. at 1529, 1536, 1545, 1550 (Newman, J., concurring; Plager, J.,
dissenting; Lourie, J., dissenting; Nies, J., dissenting, respectively).
9. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
10. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (per curiam), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
11. Id. at 1516.
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States with the patent practice of those nations.'
This Article will address a number of major topics. First, it
discusses the Federal Circuit's renewed interest in Graver Tank 3
and the merger of the infringement test with the patentability test
established by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. 14
Then, this Article responds to the dissenting judges in Hilton Davis
who emphasized the danger of uncertainty that stems from the inprinciple application of the doctrine of equivalents. This response
explains that the application of the doctrine does not increase the
uncertainty in determining infringement but, rather, encourages
clear, definitive claim drafting. It then examines the relationship
between the uncertainty in determining infringement and the patent
laws of foreign jurisdictions, and it demonstrates that the application of the doctrine proffered by the Hilton Davis majority will
increase the legal certainty of infringement determinations.
This Article also contends that the test for infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents should parallel the standard for nonobviousness. Whether there is a substantial difference between a
claimed invention and an accused device or process is a question
of law to be determined by judges on the basis of a jury's factual
findings.' 5 To enable juries to make reasonable decisions, more
detailed jury instructions than those given in Hilton Davis are
necessary. 6 In conclusion, this Article proposes a method for
restructuring U.S. patent claim interpretation theory under a central
claiming principle.
The issues and the rules of law are complex. In part, this
complexity can be attributed to courts' inconsistent dealings with
the intricacies of the doctrine of equivalents. The Hilton Davis

12. See infra part III.A.1.

13. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
14. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
15. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521-22.
16. The parties to a patent suit have a Constitutional right to have a jury
determine the validity of the patent in question. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966,
972, 976 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., American Airlines, Inc. v.
Lockwood, 115 S. Ct. 2274 (1995); see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 981-82 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that the trial court must always
instruct the jury about the detailed meaning of the patent claim), affd, 116 S. Ct.
1384 (1996).
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majority's approach valuably solidifies the legal doctrine, but its
reasoning is not flawless. A clear understanding of the majority's
analysis therefore begins with the facts of the case.
II.

HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. V. WARNER-JENKINSON CO.

A. Background
Both the plaintiff, Hilton Davis, and the defendant, WarnerJenkinson, are dye manufacturers. In 1986, both parties simultaneously began projects to develop a process which would allow
each of them to manufacture FD&C (food, drug, and cosmetic) Red
Dye #40 and Yellow Dye #6 without using an expensive "salting
out" step to remove impurities from the dyes. 7 Hilton Davis
developed the process first by using "ultrafiltration" as the
alternative to the "salting out" process.' 8 Warner-Jenkinson then
developed its accused ultrafiltration process without knowing about
the patent that was issued to Hilton Davis for its filtration process.' 9 Warner-Jenkinson began to use its process to produce Red
Dye #40 and was sued for patent infringement by Hilton Davis. 0
Language central to the outcome of this suit is located in the
Hilton Davis patent that avers that the ultrafiltration process be
operated "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0.," 21 Because the
evidence revealed that the Wamer-Jenkinson process operated at a
pH of five, it was clear that there was not a literal infringement of
the Hilton Davis patent.22 The parties nevertheless disputed the
validity of the Hilton Davis patent and whether it had ever been
infringed by the Warner-Jenkinson process under the doctrine of
equivalents. The jury found that the Hilton Davis patent was valid
and was subsequently infringed by Warner-Jenkinson, but also

17. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1515.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. This language was not initially included in the claims submitted with
the patent application, but was added during patent prosecution to distinguish the
Hilton Davis process from another patent's ultrafiltration process that operated at
a pH above nine and preferably between II and 13. Id. at 1516.
22. Id.
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noted that Warner-Jenkinson did not willfully infringe the Hilton
Davis patent. 23 The trial court denied Warner-Jenkinson's posttrial motion and entered a permanent injunction prohibiting
Warner-Jenkinson from utilizing an ultrafiltration process unless it
did so at a pressure over 500 p.s.i.g. and a pH above 9.01.24
Although Warner-Jenkinson appealed both the validity and the
infringement findings, the Federal Circuit accepted only the
infringement issue for a hearing en banc.25 Warner-Jenkinson
urged the court to find the trial court's application of the doctrine
of equivalents to be improper. 26 Warner-Jenkinson contended that
because it had independently developed the accused process, there
was no equitable basis to introduce the application of the doctrine

of equivalents in this particular case. 27

Warner-Jenkinson's

argument was based on a popular view among legal scholars and
practitioners alike that limited the scope of the doctrine of equivalents by reducing its application for equitable considerations.28
This approach has produced inconsistencies in the case law that
developed from different panels of the Federal Circuit. The court
therefore took this opportunity to resolve the ongoing uncertainty
surrounding the doctrine of equivalents and to proffer a solution to
resolve its inconsistent application.
B.

The Three Questions Posed by the Court

The Federal Circuit identified three, questions for the parties to
brief: (1) whether a finding of infringement under the doctrine of

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The three judge panel which initially heard the appeal decided the
validity issue of the patent. Id. at 1515 n.1. A separate panel opinion addresses
that issue. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 64 F.3d 675 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); see Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., No. 93-1088,
1995 WL 496748 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 8, 1995) (per curiam).
26. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
27. Id.
28. See generally Donald Chisum & William Alsup, Brief for Amicus Curiae
Urging Reversal of Judgement Under Review, Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (No. 93-1088) (proposing that the
doctrine should not apply when there is not any intentional copying), cert.
granted, 116 S.Ct. 1014 (1996).
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equivalents requires anything other than a showing of the same or
substantially similar function, way, and result between the claimed
and the accused inventions; (2) whether the issue of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable remedy that should
be decided by a judge or is an issue of fact that should be
submitted to a jury; and (3) whether the doctrine of equivalents is
to be decided at the judge's discretion depending on the circumstances of the case.2
The first question relates to the test for deciding equivalency
itself. The Federal Circuit asked whether the so-called "triple
identity test" which requires substantial similarity of function, way,
and result between the claimed and accused products or processes,
assessed according to an objective standard, is adequate, and
whether it should be the only test for infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.3 ° Many courts, including the Federal
Circuit, have viewed the triple identity test as the only test that was
required by the leading United States Supreme Court case, Graver
Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products.3' This test,
a sensible mechahowever, has been criticized for not providing
32
nism to determine the scope of a patent.
In an earlier Federal Circuit case, Judge Nies, who wrote a
dissenting opinion in Hilton Davis, sought to increase legal
certainty in the application of the doctrine of equivalents by using
other factors that the Court in Graver Tank considered to limit the
doctrine's scope. 33 Judge Nies opined that the doctrine should not

be applied unless there was an equitable basis to do so. 34 An
amicus curiae brief urging the adoption of a non-copying/independent development distinction factor to prevent unneces-

29. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
30. Id. at 1518.
31. 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
32. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (stating that the jury is "put to sea without guiding charts when called upon
to determine infringement under the doctrine"), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974 (1992).
33. International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
34. Id. at 774.
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sary application of the doctrine advocated a similar position.35
This alternative viewpoint resulted from the failure of the Supreme
Court in Graver Tank to indicate clearly whether the three-part test

was the exclusive test for deciding equivalency, as well as from the
lower courts' subsequent use of the three-part test as the primary
test.3 6

Although all the Federal Circuit judges agreed that the three-part
test is inadequate, the majority in Hilton Davis surprised the patentusing community by rejecting recent case developments that limited
application of the doctrine according to equitable considerations. 7
The court held that although the doctrine was founded on equitable
fairness, the ultimate issue must be submitted to the trier-of-fact
and is not a matter of the court's equitable discretion.3" The
majority also replaced the three-part test with a substantial
difference test.39 This test considers the identity of function, way,

and result, as well as other objective evidence, in determining
whether a substantial difference exists between a claimed and an
accused product or process.4 0 If the differences were deemed
insubstantial, then the doctrine would apply.4
In Hilton Davis, the majority did not consider any subjective
evidence (such as the defendant's lack of knowledge of the
existence of the plaintiff's patent) to determine whether there was
an infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 2 Because this
analysis did not emphasize the equitable nature of the doctrine, a
number of judges on the panel objected to the court's outcome by

35. Donald Chisum & William Alsup, Brief for Amicus Curiae Urging
Reversal of Judgment Under Review at 13-15, Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (No. 93-1088), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
36. See TOSHIKO TAKENAKA, INTERPRETING PATENT CLAIMS: THE UNITED
STATES, GERMANY AND JAPAN 113-34 (17 IIC Studies-Studies in Industrial
Property and Copyright Law 1995).
37. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
38. Id. at 1521-22.
39. Id. at 1519-20.
40. Id. at 1521-22.
41. Id. (i.e., substantial differences would bar application of the doctrine).
42. Id. at 1520.

DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS AFTER HILTON DAvis

487

filing dissents 43 and citing recent case developments."

In her

1996]

dissent, Judge Nies took the strongest position and objected to any
application of the doctrine in this case.4 5
The second and third questions posed by the court in Hilton
Davis raised the question of whether infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is an equitable remedy. 46 The majority's
and the dissenting judges' answers to this question highlight a
fundamental disagreement between them. The majority views the
doctrine as being part of the determination of a legal remedy.47
The majority asserts that the Supreme Court's use of the terms
"equitable" and "equity" indicates, in the broadest sense, "fairness,"
and is not used in the technical sense to invoke the body of
equitable doctrine that originated in the Chancellor's Courts in
England. 48 The majority's view, therefore, is that the doctrine
must automatically be applied after finding that there is not a literal
infringement, and the jury must decide the issue of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.4 9
All five dissenting judges agreed that the doctrine of equivalents
is equitable in the sense that it originated from the courts of
equity.5" They argued that the doctrine should not be used unless
there is an equitable basis for its application in a particular case,
and that judges should have the exclusive authority to decide

43. Id. at 1536, 1545, 1550 (Plager, J.; Lourie, J.; Nies, J.; dissenting).
44. E.g., Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that the doctrine of equivalents should be carefully
confined to its equitable role in order to promote clarity and certainty); Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (averring that
the doctrine of equivalents is designed to do equity and that a court may not
disregard the structural and functional limitations of the language of a claim on
which the public is entitled to rely to avoid infringement), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
961, and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (proffering that
the doctrine of equivalents exists solely for equitable purposes).
45. Id. at 1579-81 (Nies, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1516.
47. Id. at 1521.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1522.
50. Id. at 1525.
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whether such a basis exists.51 Judge Nies further argued that both
the majority's in-principle application of the doctrine to find an

infringement and its holding that a patent inherently covers
equivalents will completely change current claim drafting. 2
Judge Nies also criticized the majority's historical analysis of the
issue of whether a judge or jury should decide whether a patent has
been infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 3 She claimed
that the majority's arguments were oversimplified and suggested
that the Supreme Court should revisit the infringement issue
because it has not been addressed since there were major revisions
to the patent statute in 1952." 4 The Supreme Court has decided
to consider the infringement issues set out in Hilton Davis.5
C. The Court's Disposition
The Federal Circuit affirmed the jury's finding of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. 6 The majority found the trial
court's jury instructions to be sufficient even though the trial court
stated that the jury "may" rely on the function-way-result test. 7
The satisfaction of the three-part test is often enough to prove
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 8 The majority
agreed with the trial court and rejected Wamer-Jenkinson's
equitable argument that the doctrine of equivalents should not be
applied because the process was independently developed. 9 The
majority stated that subjective evidence, such as knowledge of the

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

E.g., id. at 1540 (Plager, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1562 (Nies, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1579 (Nies, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1578-79 (Nies, J., dissenting).
Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1014

(1996); Supreme Court Will Consider Standard For Patent Infringement By
Equivalents, BNA PAT., TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Feb. 28, 1996.

56. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.

57. Id. at 1523. The trial court phrased its jury instructions as follows:
You may find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents when the
accused process and the claimed invention perform substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to yield substantially the same result
even though the processes differ in name, form or shape.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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existence of a patent, is irrelevant to showing substantial differences and, thus, to deciding infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 6' The court reflected that even though the trial court
could have further guided the jury by instructing it not to consider
the independent development evidence when deciding the infringement issue, the trial court was nonetheless correct to direct the jury
to base infringement on an assessment of the other evidence
relevant to the substantiality of the differences when applying the
function-way-result test.62 The court determined that the jury
instructions were tailored to both the arguments and the evidence
presented by the parties.63
The court then reviewed the jury's finding of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents.'
The court reviewed this finding
under a "supported by substantial evidence" standard.65 Under
such a limited standard of review, the court was unable to consider
independently evaluating the evidence presented.66 The majority
determined that there was sufficient and substantial evidence
regarding the pH range,67 the membrane pressure, and pore size, to
affirm the jury verdict.
The majority also rejected Warner-Jenkinson's request to apply
prosecution history estoppel to prevent a finding of infringement. 68 Contrary to recent courts which have held that when
claim language is altered during prosecution, the application of the
doctrine of equivalents is estopped,69 the majority declared that
prosecution history estoppel only applies to the claim language that
was altered to avoid prior art. 70 The majority found that although
Hilton Davis had a literal claim between six and nine as a pH
level, Hilton Davis had not surrendered a pH value lower than six

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1523.
Id.
Id. at 1524.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1525.
E.g., Wang Lab., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

70. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1525.
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because the patentee's (Hilton Davis') insertion of the lower limit
was unnecessary to avoid prior art.7' Thus, the verdict of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was proper despite the
accused ultrafiltration process being operated at a pH level of five
which is not within the literal scope of the patent.
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Advantages of the "SubstantialDifference" Test
1.

The Hilton Davis Test for Infringement Under the
Doctrine of Equivalents and Its Relationship to the
German and Japanese Tests

The Hilton Davis majority's reasoning contradicts the fundamental principle that the claim language determines the patent's
scope. 2 The court failed to limit the patent because it did not
adhere to the clearly stated limitation on the range of pH values.

Some have strongly criticized the Hilton Davis majority because its
holding increased the uncertainty in the test for infringement; they
have averred that the court adopted an unclear and abstract
"substantial difference" test because the term "substantial" is
inherently flexible and uncertain.73
In its opinion, the majority stated that its purpose was "to
restate--not to revise" the test for infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents.7 4 The Hilton Davis majority, however, deleted the
three-part test that had been uniformly applied by the Federal
Circuit to determine infringement and replaced it with a new
"substantial difference" test.7 5 The majority also emphasized
several objective tests which evaluate the difference between the

71. Id.
72. E.g., Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 699
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that the claim, and not the specification, determines the
measure of the invention), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
73. See, e.g., Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1562 (Nies, J., dissenting) (claiming
that the test for infringement was "made wholly arbitrary" by the majority).
74. Id. at 1516.
75. See id. at 1521-22 (explaining that in addition to the traditional functionway-result analysis used in the "substantial difference" test, the fact-finder should
consider other factors such as copying and designing around).
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claimed and accused inventions.76 One such test is based on
whether persons who are reasonably skilled in the art would have
known of the interchangeability of an element in the patent and one
not contained in the patent."
Infringement analysis under the doctrine of equivalents as set
forth in Hilton Davis is similar to the central claim drafting
principle in the German patent system. 78 The paradigm for this
claim drafting principle is a system that emphasizes the protection
Patent claims
of the technical idea embodied in the invention.
under this system merely describe an example of the invention. 0
The central claim drafting principle provides that the courts should
not be bound by the claim language selected by the patentee, but
should be free to extend a patent's scope of protection to the
accused embodiment which shares the same technical idea
underlying the patented invention. s
U.S. courts followed this
practice prior to 1950.82

German and Japanese practitioners would also find the "substantial difference" test familiar to the extent that evaluation of the
substantiality of any difference depends on consideration of both
the three-part identity test83 and the knowledge of interchangeability test.' For a long period of time, Germany had used this

76. Id. at 1525 (stating that "the substantiality of the differences between the
claimed and accused products ... is the ultimate question under the doctrine of
equivalents").
77. Id. at 1519 (holding that an "'important factor' to be considered . . . 'is
whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that
was."') (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
609 (1950)).
78. TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 7. The central claiming system in Germany
was modified to meet the requirements of the European Patent Convention. Id.
at 36.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 26 (protecting the inventive idea or concept including what the
inventor invented as well as minor modifications).
81. Id. at 8-9.
82. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1578 (Nies, J., dissenting).
83. See infra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the substantial
difference test in Graver Tank, i.e., the three-part identity test).
84. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the knowledge of
interchangeability test).
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patentability standard to determine the scope of patent protection. 5 After the 1981 revision of Germany's patent law to meet
the European Patent Convention Article 69 requirements, 6 the

German Federal Supreme Court reaffirmed the test in Formstein."7
The Court declared that an accused embodiment makes equivalent
use of a patented invention if one skilled in the art, having taken
into consideration the disclosures made in the patent and his or her
general knowledge, would have conceived of replacing the disputed
element of the accused embodiment with the corresponding element
in the claimed invention to obtain the same result.8 8
89
Although this test closely resembles the inventive step test,
the Court did not clearly state this similarity, and this ambiguous
relationship between the inventive step and infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents has caused a split in German case law. One
German Supreme Court case indicated that patentability is relevant
to finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,9" while
another found infringement under the doctrine despite the presence
of a patent granted to the accused device. 9' The most recent
decision of the German Supreme Court finally eliminated this
confusion and declared that the accused device cannot infringe a
patent under the doctrine of equivalents if the patent office granted
a patent to the accused device. 92

85. See TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 26-36.
86. European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 69 (entered into force Oct.
7, 1977), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

143, 169-70 (Marshall A. Leafier ed., 1990) [hereinafter European Patent
Convention]. Article 69(1) provides: "The extent of the protection conferred by
a European patent or a European patent application shall be determined by the
terms of the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings shall be used to
interpret the claims." Id. art. 69(1).
87. "Moulded Curbstone" (Formstein), 18 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 795, 798 (1987) (BGH).
88. Id.
89. "An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of
the state of the art." European Patent Convention, supra note 86, art. 54(1).
90. "Ion Analysis" (lonenanalyse), 22 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 249, 255 (1991) (BGH 1988).
91. "Fixing Device Hf" (BefestigungsvorrichtungII), 23 INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 111, 115-20 (1992) (BGH 1990).
92. "Segmentation Device for Tree Trunks" (Zerlegvorrichtungfur Baumstamme), 26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 261, 267 (1995) (BGH
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Japanese courts and legal scholars have adopted the German
infringement test interpreting it to consist of two components.93
The first component evaluates the operation and result of an
invention, and requires that the disputed element of the accused
invention attain the same result as the corresponding element in the
claimed invention.94 This is called the "interchangeability," or
"chikan kanousei," test.95 The second component evaluates the
structure of the invention and requires that one skilled in the art
would have conceived of the interchangeability of the disputed
element and claimed element.96

This is called the "readiness of

finding interchangeability," or "chikan youisei," test.97 Japanese
courts seldom find infringement when applying the doctrine of
equivalents.9" When they do apply the doctrine, they will find
infringement only if there is an affirmative answer to both
components of the aforementioned test.99
While the Japanese test for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents resembles the inventive step test, the Japanese courts
have never declared that they are the same. Some scholars and
court decisions suggest that the substantial difference required to
avoid infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is less than
that for upholding the inventive step of the invention over the prior
art. °° These tests, however, are in fact the same because the
1994); Jochen Pagenberg, More Refined Rules of Claim Interpretation in
Germany--Are They Necessary?, 26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
228, 231, 232 (1995).
93. TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 257 (citing KOSAKU YOSHIFUJI, TOKKYOHO
GAISETSU (Outline of Patent Law) 381, 411 (8th ed. 1988)).
94. Id.
95. NOBUHIRO NAKAYAMA, CHUKAI TOKKYOHO 660 (2d ed. 1989). This test
has also been referred to as the "substitution capability" test. TAKENAKA, supra
note 36, at 257.
96. TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 257 (citing KOSAKU YOSHIFUJI, TOKKYOHO
GAISETSU (Outline of Patent Law) 381, 411 (8th ed. 1988)).
97. NAKAYAMA, supra note 95, at 660. The test has also been referred to as
the obviousness test. TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 257.

98. TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 243.
99. Judgment of Sup. Ct., May 29, 1987, Juristo (No. 903) 85 (1988);
Judgment of Tokyo High Ct., Feb. 3, 1994, 44 Tokkyo Kannri (No. 10) 1389
(1994).
100. NOBUHIRO

NAKAYAMA,

Property Law) 352 (1993).

KOUGYOU

SHOYUUKENN

Ho

(Intellectual
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same test was used to find either the presence or lack of an
invention to uphold both infringement and patentability under the
old patent law.'0 In particular, under the old law,'12 the Patent
Office determined validity and infringement using the inventive
step test. 0 3 To reflect these historical developments, the Japanese Patent Office used the term "equivalency" in its recently
revised examination guidelines to indicate the test to find a

substantially
identical invention which anticipated the claimed
invention. °
A closer examination of the substantial difference test articulated
in Hilton Davis, with its three-part sub-test, requiring identity in
function, way, and result reveals that it is comparable to the
Japanese courts' interchangeability test. Both tests evaluate an
invention with respect to its operation. Similarly, the -sub-test
requiring knowledge of interchangeability by one skilled in the art
is comparable to the readiness of interchangeability test. Thus, the
Hilton Davis substantial difference test is closely aligned with the
doctrine of equivalents tests in both Japanese and German courts,
except that the former is applied at the date of infringement, while
the latter is applied as of the patent's filing date. Although the
U.S. government's withdrawal from negotiations indefinitely
delayed the process of harmonizing the substantive aspects of Paris
Union member states' patent laws,0 5 the U.S. Federal Circuit
significantly contributed to the harmonization of patent claim

101. Id.
102. Tokkyoho (Patent Law), Law No. 96 (1921) (Japan).
103. Unlike the current system where the courts have jurisdiction to decide
infringement, prior practice required parties to bring infringement issues to the
Japanese Patent Office which decided a patent's scope through a protection scope
certification trial. See TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 44.
104. KATSURA YOSHIMINE, SHINSA KIJUN NO KAISETSU (Explanations for
Examination Standards) 122 (1984). The most recent revision of Japanese
patentability standards, however, removed this equivalency test to clarify the
distinction between novelty and the inventive step. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE,
EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND UTILITY MODEL IN JAPAN (1994).

105. Toshiko Takenaka, Recent Developments on the WIPO PatentHarmonization Treaty Consultative Meeting, CASRIP Newsletter (CASRIP, University of
Washington School of Law), Spring 1995, at 9, 9.
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06
interpretation by adopting the substantial difference test.'

2.

Hilton Davis Merged the Test for Infringement Under the
Doctrine of Equivalents with the Non-Obviousness Test

The same question that has plagued both German and Japanese
courts--whether the substantial difference test is the same as the
test for finding non-obviousness--remains unanswered. The U.S.
courts, like those in both Germany and Japan, formerly used one
standard to decide both infringement and patentability.0 7 Two
standards were created when the lower courts interpreted Graver
as using the three-part substantial difference test and
Tank'
' as using the non-obviousness test.
Graham v. John Deere Co. 09
Prior to Graver Tank, the Supreme Court often upheld an object's
patentability, but denied its patent's infringement based on both a
comparison of the accused patented device and the prior art, and
the Court's reasoning that the two devices are separate and
different inventions." 0 The Supreme Court's usage of terms such
as "the essence of invention" or "heart of invention" also suggests
that the subject of the protection afforded at that time was the
invention or concept, rather than the claim itself."' Because the

106. Japanese courts recently further harmonized their case law on claim
interpretation with U.S. case law by adopting the test comparable to Hilton's
"Substantial Difference" test and introducing Hilton's limitation on the application
of prosecution history estoppel. See Toshiko Takenaka, New Policy in Interpreting Japanese Patents, CASRIP Newsletter (CASRIP, University of Washington
School of Law), Spring/Summer 1996, at 1, 1.
107. See Toshiko Takenaka, An Additional Test for the Doctrine of Equivalents? A Comparative Study Perspectiveon International Visual Corp. v. Crown
Metal Manufacturing., in 1 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE LEGAL

INTERPRETATION OF PATENT CLAIMS 102 (Donald S. Chisum et al. eds., 1995).
108. 167 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
109. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (holding that non-obviousness is a more practical
test for patentability).
110. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608-09; cf. National Cash Register Co. v.
Boston Cash Indicator & Recorder Co., 156 U.S. 502, 517 (1895) (holding that
infringement was proven via the doctrine of equivalents).
111. See, e.g., Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1563 (Nies, J., dissenting) (noting that
historically the emphasis was not on specifying claims); Toshiko Takenaka,
Abhangige Erfindung und Reichweite des Patents, in THEORIEN ZUM RECHT DES
FESTSCHRIFT ZUM 70.
GEISTIGEN EIGENTUMS UND WETTBEWERBSRECHTS:
GEBURSTAG VON PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER 32 (1996); Toshiko
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Hilton Davis majority returned to the Graver Tank standard, the
substantial difference test is now the same as the test for patentability, i.e., the test for non-obviousness.

That the substantial difference test and the non-obviousness test
are equivalent is further supported by the fact that the three-part
test in Graver Tank, which was affirmed by the majority in Hilton
Davis, is also the same as the sub-tests used for finding nonobviousness. The three-part test is parallel to the objective test for
finding non-obviousness with respect to operational or functional
features," 2 and the knowledge of interchangeability test is parallel to the objective test with respect to structural and methodological features." 3 The test of whether the inventor copied the
patented invention relies upon a secondary consideration of copying
under the non-obviousness standard. ' 14 In both the infringement
and non-obviousness tests, copying is considered to the extent it
indicates a substantial difference between two inventions.' 15 The
Hilton Davis court rejected all evidence which was extraneous to
the non-obviousness evaluation; this included where there was an
intent to copy, whether the invention was a pioneer invention, and
whether the accused product was a disclaimed embodiment.
By establishing the same threshold to grant a patent and to
escape an infringement charge, the courts would require competitors to make an inventive effort to qualify for the designing around
exception.' 16 This encourages innovation, rather than imitation,
and therefore is consistent with fundamental patent policy to duly
reward an inventor.'
If the substantiality of the difference
required to find infringement were less than that to patent a product
or process, patentees' continuing works may then lack protection.
Such works would not be protected by the doctrine of equivalents
Takenaka, Riyou Hatsumei to Tokkyo Hatsumei no Hogo Hann-i, in CHITEKI
ZAISAN TO KYoUsoU HO NO RIRON 123 (1996).
112. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 5.0315][a] (1994).

113. See id.

114. See id.
115. See supra notes 107-14 (discussing the three-part tests for substantial
difference and non-obviousness).
116. TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 298.
117. Id.
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when the difference from the underlying patented invention is
substantial, but still not sufficient to qualify for a .separate patent.
Thus, the same standard must be adopted for both infringement and
patentability to protect effectively all of the improvements resulting
from continuous research and development projects and to
encourage further improvements. Furthermore, if the substantial
difference test were the same as the non-obviousness test, courts
could enjoy the benefit of a rich body of case law established by
the Federal Circuit regarding non-obviousness, rather than starting
anew.
3.

Hilton Davis Increased the Legal Certainty of the Test for
Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents

Another positive result of the decision in Hilton Davis is that
there is less uncertainty in litigating infringement issues than there
would have been had the dissent's view been adopted. The
"uniform substantial difference" test"' and the "knowledge of
interchangeability" sub-test" 9 adopted by the Hilton Davis
majority provides more certainty in the determination of patent
infringement than the multiple test. The three dissents proposed
selecting from multiple tests, such as tests for copying or identifying pioneering inventions, as well as the two-pronged test,
requiring interchangeability and readiness of interchangeability, to
2°
find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Many problems would result from the introduction of multiple
tests. For example, one could predict that there would be problems
with the non-obviousness test that the dissent proposed because
Japanese experience with a similar set of multiple tests has
revealed that this will cause confusion. The Japanese courts have
applied the doctrine of equivalents similar to the manner in which
2
the Hilton Davis dissent has proposed they be applied.' ' Thus,
Japanese industry chooses not to recognize infringement under the

118.
119.
120.
121.
at 1550

See supra part III.A.1.
See supra part III.A.1.
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1543-45, 1547-49, 1579.
Id. at 1536 (Plager, J., dissenting); id. at 1545 (Lourie, J., dissenting); id.
(Nies, J., dissenting).
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doctrine of equivalents at all.'

In Hilton Davis, the majority held that these sub-tests are to be
used only to the extent necessary to ascertain the result of the
primary test-the substantiality of the difference between the
claimed and the accused inventions.123 The adoption of the
dissenting opinion's proposal would have moved U.S. patent claim
interpretation closer to Japanese practice and would have been
welcomed by Japanese practitioners. 24 The Federal Circuit,
however, chose not to adopt this view and reached a more efficient
conclusion by limiting a court's discretion to select a test and
thereby preventing the uncertainty introduced by such discretion.
The majority also chose to reject applying these sub-tests which
employ subjective factors, such as the defendant's knowledge of a
patent, to prevent the uncertainty which would have otherwise
existed. If the majority had agreed with the dissenters and found
that knowledge of the patent's existence were relevant to finding
infrngement,125 then patentees could not determine whether their
patents had been infringed until discovery revealed the defendants'
knowledge. A finding of infringement would depend on each
party's knowledge of the patent's existence and would introduce a
significant degree of uncertainty into any infringement case.
Furthermore, if a lack of knowledge of a patent's existence were
to allow a party to escape the penalties associated with infringement, then competitors would be discouraged from fully investigating existing patents prior to making and selling their products.
This would clearly undermine the fundamental policy of placing a
duty on those in the industry to ascertain that which has been
patented to prevent any form of patent infringement. It would also
discourage the use of information that is disclosed in patent
publications because such inspection could increase the possibility
of learning about a previously patented product or process.
Incorporating knowledge into an infringement case would frustrate
122. See TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 67, 243.
123. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1512.
124. Toshiko Takenaka, Beikoku Tokkyo Kureimu Kaishaku no Saikin no
Doukou (The Recent Development of the Patent Claim Interpretation in the United
States), 17 CHIZAIKEN FORUM 2 (1994).

125. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1563 (Nies, J., dissenting).
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the fundamental patent policy of disseminating technical information through the patent's disclosure so as to avoid double investment in the same technology. The current patent system still
encourages one to design around a claim to avoid infringement. 2 6 Thus, by rejecting a test based on a subjective knowledge factor, the majority furthers not only the interest of preventing
legal uncertainty, but also of adhering to basic patent policy.
The Hilton Davis majority correctly focused on the benefit of the
sub-test based on the knowledge of one skilled in the art with
This sub-test will significantly
respect to interchangeability.
increase the legal certainty in finding equivalency. The test
evaluating solely the substantial identity of the function, way, and
result is incomplete because it mainly focuses on the operational
features of the invention and pays little attention to the structural
features. The sub-test concerning the knowledge of interchangeability focuses the evaluation of the invention on its structural
features as well as its operational features.
The test requiring knowledge of interchangeability is more
objective and more sensible than the three-part test because it takes
into account the state of the art and can reward the inventor based
on the technical significance of the invention. 7 German courts
and legal scholars have long recognized that an evaluation focusing
on structural features provides a more objective test than one
focusing on operational features. 128 These courts have replaced
their method for examining the patentability of an invention with
the non-obviousness test.'29 Current infringement practice in
Germany also focuses more on the non-obviousness of the interchangeability than on function and result identity. 3 ° The benefit
of this practice is well illustrated by the German courts' analysis

126. See DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2F (1992) (describing the methods for
determining patent infringement).
127. TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 298-302.
128. Id. at 298-99.
129. Id.; see HANNS ULLRICH, STANDARDS OF PATENTABILITY FOR EUROPEAN
INVENTIONS (1 IIC Studies-Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law
1977).
130. TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 301-02.
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of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and its reliance
on this objective evidence.' 3 '
Both scholars and courts in the United States are aware of the
advantage of the test focusing on the non-obviousness of the
interchangeability over the test focusing solely on the operation and
result, and have selected the former as the primary standard to
determine non-obviousness. 132 The same courts and scholars,
however, have neglected to select this test for the doctrine of
equivalents. The Hilton Davis decision places more weight on the
knowledge of interchangeability by one skilled in the art than on
triple identity. This allows U.S. judges and juries to decide the
substantiality of any differences in a more objective manner. Legal
scholars have shown that they can reach the result of known
interchangeability by relying on such objective factors as the
patented invention itself, the prior art, evidence of developing
trends in the particular field, and expert testimony. 133 Furthermore, as long as the scope of infringement is limited by the
knowledge of one skilled in the art, legal certainty is better assured
because competitors are alerted to known equivalents which fall
within this scope. This certainty effectively precludes unpleasant
surprises.
4.

Future Problems

The majority's efforts to return to the doctrine of equivalents as
articulated in Graver Tank is deficient because it fails to clearly
state that the substantial difference test is the same as the nonobviousness test. The experience of German courts indicates that
an unclear relationship between the test for infringement and the
131. For example, see Improver Corp. & Sicommerce AG v. Remington Prods.
Inc., 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 572 (1990) (OLG 1988). This

case is analyzed in Takenaka, supra note 107, at 116-20. See Allan M. Soobert,
Analyzing Infringement by Equivalents: A Proposal to Focus the Scope of
InternationalPatent Protection, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 189, 21114 (1996).

132. Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for
Patents, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 293 (1966) (analyzing the three
possible tests for patentability and concluding that only the non-obviousness test
survives after Graham v. John Deere Co.).
133. Takenaka, supra note 107, at 119.
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test for patentability creates confusion.'34 This confusion has
also arisen in U.S. courts. The U.S. courts may be uncertain as to
whether they can use the case law developed under the test of nonobviousness to evaluate knowledge of interchangeability. The U.S.
courts must only use case law predating the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Graver Tank to evaluate knowledge of interchangeability if the courts do not use the case law developed under
the non-obviousness test when evaluating interchangeability.
One issue plaguing the German courts is whether a subsequently
developed device or process infringes an earlier patent because
infringement is decided by the one-skilled-in-the-art's knowledge
of interchangeability at the time of infringement rather than at the
time of the application date. 35 Knowledge of interchangeability
at the time of filing is inconsequential to this finding.136 The
U.S. courts, however, may need to resolve whether infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents should be affirmed, even if the
exchangeability of the accused product was not known to one
skilled in the art at the time of invention, but became known
through expansion of knowledge by the time the product was
manufactured. Not finding infringement of an invention at one
time, but finding infringement for the same invention at another
time is unreasonable. The U.S. courts will need to determine a
way to avoid this unreasonable result.
B. Advantages of In-PrincipleApplication of the Doctrine of
Equivalents
1.

Returning to In-PrincipleApplication of the Doctrine of
Equivalents

The Hilton Davis majority rejected the notion that judges have
the discretion to apply the doctrine of equivalents depending on the
presence of an equitable basis for its application in a particular
case.'
The court noted that once trial courts find that there is

134.
135.
136.
137.

Pagenberg, supra note 92, at 228-29.
Id.
Id.
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
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not a literal infringement of the patent, they must examine infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 3 ' Each of the three
dissents strongly opposed the majority's view that infringement
under the doctrine originates in the common law.' 39 In particular, Judge Nies argued that courts should not apply the doctrine of
equivalents unless the invention is described in means-plus-function
She insisted that Congress' codification of § 112
form. 4 '
6,'
which extends claims to cover equivalents, should be
interpreted to preclude application of the doctrine, unless the
applicant adopts a means-plus-function format.'42 She concluded
that by affirming the in-principle application of the doctrine of
equivalents, the majority opinion returned U.S. patent claim
interpretation to the status that existed prior to the shift from the
central claiming principle to the peripheral claiming principle. "
The central claiming principle required that a court determine a
patent's scope by defining the principle that formed the inventive
idea or solution underlying the claim language.'" In contrast,
the peripheral claiming principle directed a court to determine the
patent's scope by looking at the claim language; the courts' role
was to clarify the language and apply it to the accused device or
process.' 4 5 Contrary to the basic impression that indicates a wide
gap between these two methods, these two approaches to claim
interpretation have become increasingly intertwined as statutes and

138. Id.
139. Id. at 1536-83.
140. Id. at 1559-60 (Nies, J., dissenting).
141. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
142. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1559 (Nies, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting). For a general discussion and overview of central
and peripheral claiming principles and their historical developments, see

TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 6. Under the central claiming principle, the claim
functions as an indication of the center point of the scope of protection and is
expanded by the courts if the patent is litigated. Id. Under the peripheral
claiming principle, the claim functions as an indication of the peripheral boundary
of the patent scope. Id.
144. See TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 3. ("Germany is the paradigm of a
country that employs the central definition theory.").
145. Id. To patent professionals and scholars, the United States is the model
country employing the peripheral claiming principle. Id.
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practices related to claim function have changed and evolved.
They have also become more interconnected as claim interpretation
doctrines have been judicially created.' 47
The United States once employed the central claiming principle
whereby the claim's significance increased as the examination
system developed."' Because the earliest U.S. patent statutes did
not require that the claim be included in the application, the claim
was insignificant even after the practice of stating an invention was
adopted by the patent community. 4 9 Once the 1836 Act 50
codified the judicially created duty to include the claim language,
the U.S. patent system allowed use of claim language in the
"substantially as herein described" format. 51 After the 1836 Act
was codified, the case law indicates that the claim merely identified
an example of the invention created by the inventor.'
The shift toward the peripheral claiming principle began at the
end of last century and commenced with the striking of the
"substantially as described" format from claim drafting practice. ' The shift came in response to the refusal to extend the
scope of protection to variations of claimed inventions.' 4
Although the shift from the inventor's interest to the public's
interest first became apparent in the 1930s and 1940s, the shift has
never been fully completed because the Supreme Court did not
reject such ambiguous expressions as in the means-plus-function
The return to the central claiming principle
format claims."'

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1563 (Nies, J., dissenting).
149. Warren T. Jessup, The Doctrine of Equivalents, 54 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
248, 254 (1972).
150. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117.
151. Jessup, supra note 149, at 254.
152. See TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 9 (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 11.
154. Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274 (1877) (holding

that the patent cannot cover variations or improvements upon the patented
invention).
155. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting). Despite public
interest concerns about the use of ambiguous terms, the Patent Act of 1952
legitimized the means-plus-function format. Patent Law Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66
Stat. 798 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994)).
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became apparent when the Supreme Court endorsed infringement
factors under the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank.'56
Although public interest concerns resurfaced in Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc. 157 and sought to limit the doctrine, more
recent decisions from the Federal Circuit indicate that the U.S.
patent system prefers the central claiming principle over the
peripheral claiming principle.158
All three dissenting opinions in Hilton Davis urge either limiting
or abolishing the use of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents because they espouse that the doctrine creates uncertainty in infringement results.' 59 This argument, however, is not
persuasive because it overstates the evils of uncertainty and fails to
take into account the benefits of the doctrine.
First, limiting infringement to the literal patent scope does not
remove the uncertainty of infringement results unless the court
limits infringement to the embodiments described in the specification."' When an infringer produces a product which is not
identical to one of the embodiments in the specification, courts
must examine whether the disputed claim term includes the
replacement or addition that was utilized by the infringer. 6 ' This
is well-illustrated in Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical
Industries,162 where the parties vigorously disputed whether a
simple term such as "on" included the relation of two elements in
the accused
device or excluded it with respect to a prior art
3
device.

6

Japanese case law further illustrates this point. According to
Japanese patent policy, legal certainty and competitors' interests in

156.

339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).

157. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961, and cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
158. E.g., Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
159.

Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1536-83.

160. See Clarence J. Fleming, The Doctrine of Equivalents--Should It Be
Available in the Absence of Copying?, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 233,

238 (1994).
161.

Id.

162. 888 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
163. Id. at 817.
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designing outweigh the inventors' interests in being rewarded for
their inventions. 1"' Japanese courts seldom use the doctrine of
equivalents to find infringement,' 65 but still cannot completely
remove the uncertainty which results from evaluating whether the
disputed claim term includes the undisclosed replacement or
addition.'6 6 Removing the uncertainty would mean that a court's
claim interpretation included only embodiments in the specification
language regardless of how the claim is drafted because the
embodiments are assumed to be included unless they are expressly
disclosed or excluded. 67 This practice, however, contravenes the
patent policy that encourages innovation by rewarding inventors.
For this reason, U.S. industry has extensively criticized the
Japanese practice. 168
Second, the doctrine of equivalents encourages including a clear
and definite description of the invention. 69 When the requirement of explicit claim drafting is stringently enforced, applicants
tend to use more abstract and indefinite words such as "substantially" and "approximately" to anticipate and include possible future
variations.171 If inclusion of obvious future modifications or
variations of the patented invention is expected under the doctrine
of equivalents, applicants are encouraged to use more definite terms
to describe the inventions. One can readily expect that complete
removal of the doctrine will lead to the adoption of the means-plusfunction format in claim drafting, as well as the use of relative or
7
functional terms such as "substantially" and "approximately."' '1

164. See Toshiko Takenaka, The Role of the Japanese Patent System in
Japanese Industry, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 25, 25 (1994) (discussing the
Japanese patent policy of not providing much protection for the invention while
protecting the patent applicant's rights).
165. Andrew H. Thorson & John A. Fortkort, Japan's Patent System: An
Analysis of Patent Protection Under Japan's First-to-FileSystem (pt. II), 77 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 291, 306 (1995).

166. Id. at 308.
167. TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 209-10.
168. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: U.S.
COMPANIES' PATENT EXPERIENCES IN JAPAN

(1993).

169. RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS 10-12 (1949).
170. See id. at 4-6 (discussing the central claiming principle).
171. See id.

506

RUTGERS COMPUTER

&

TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

This would obscure even the point at which claim interpretation
should begin.
Third, the dissenting judges, and particularly Judge Nies, failed
to consider the need for a clearer process of determining infringement to incorporate the patent policy of encouraging innovation. 172 By effectively punishing applicants who have failed to
draft a claim clear enough to include the defendant's product, the
dissenting judges assume that inventors should have been aware of
all possible future modifications and should have drafted claims to
include them. In practice, perfect claim drafting that covers all
future modifications, while excluding all prior art, is impossi73
ble. 1
The impossibility of perfect claim drafting of all future modifications is particularly true in the case of pioneering inventions.
When the innovation is sophisticated in relation to the existing state
of art, an inventor can conceive of only a few modifications when
applying that technology.' 74 Consequently, it is very difficult to
draft a claim to anticipate future modifications when the state of
the art and the body of knowledge evolves through the contributions of other inventors. 75 Inventors of pioneer inventions may
be able to draft broad claims because no prior art exists to prevent
them from doing so.' 76 They may, however, be penalized for
failing to satisfy the enablement requirement because all possible
embodiments covered in the claim are not disclosed sufficiently for
those skilled in the art. 177 Alternatively, they may not be able to

172. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
173. See generally Robert D. Katz & Steven E. Lee, Advanced Claim Drafting
andAmendment Writingfor ChemicalInventions, 426 PLI PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS & LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 121 (1995)

(discussing the difficulty of claim drafting).
174. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 854 (1990) (discussing the doctrine of
equivalents and pioneer inventions).
175. See Katz & Lee, supra note 173 and accompanying text.
176. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
177. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that some argue
narrower claims would not provide real protection because the disclosure
requirement enables any person skilled in the art to reconstruct the invention).
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enjoy a broad scope of protection because the application of the
reverse doctrine of equivalents may prevent enforcing the patent as
Rigid application of the enablement
broadly as drafted."'
requirement and the removal of the doctrine of equivalents would
result in an insufficient reward for pioneer inventions when
compared to contributions made to the art.
A more practical view is suggested by Judge Rich in Wilson
the
Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates:
doctrine of equivalents does not change the claims, but rather
expands the right to exclude equivalents of that which is
claimed. 8 ' The central claiming principle is based on this view
and does not require an inventor to draft a claim covering future
The claim's role is to indicate the subject
modifications.' 8 '
matter that is to be examined by the Patent Office to certify that
the claimed invention is sufficiently distinct and patentable in
relation to existing technology. 82 It is not the Patent Office's
role to evaluate the claimed invention with respect to future
modifications and variations.8 3 Instead, the courts reevaluate the
claimed invention when a modification is created and then litigated
for infringement. 84 Although the courts cannot invade the scope
of protection determined by the Patent Office in light of the
existing technology, the courts are free to interpret the scope on the
basis of the claim with respect to future modifications, even if that
interpretation goes beyond the scope that was granted by the Patent
Office.' 85 The central claiming principle employs the doctrine of
equivalents to compensate for the impossibility of drafting a perfect
claim; this doctrine allows inventors to expand the claim's scope
to that which the inventor would have initially claimed if the
inventor knew about the features of the defendants' products and

178.
179.
180.
181.

Merges & Nelson, supra note 174, at 862.
904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
Id. at 684.
Dietrich Reimer, The Scope of Protection Provided by a Patent Under

German Patent Law, in PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING AND INTERPRETATION 143

(John A. Kemp et al. eds., 1983).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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processes. 116
Unfortunately, Judge Rich's suggestion does not clarify the
triangular relationship among the claimed invention, the accused
embodiment, and the prior art.'87 The German scholar Bernhard
Geissler suggested that the claimed invention and accused product
must be nonobvious from the prior art to maintain the validity of
the claimed invention, and the accused product must be obvious
from the claimed invention. 8 Judge Rich failed to note that the
reason for reading the claim to include obvious modifications is
that no one but the inventor can claim a patent for them. If the
accused product is obvious from the claimed invention, the
189
defendant would never have been able to patent the product.
Such obvious modifications have never been in the public
domain;' 90 instead, they have always belonged to the inventors

because it was their patented inventions that made obvious, to
those skilled in the art, not only the claimed invention but also
obvious variations.' 9' This also provides warnings about the
variations to competitors because the variations are those that one
would have conceived as being obvious from the publication of the
claim, taking into account the disclosure in the specification and
the general knowledge of one skilled in the art.192
In short, the removal of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents would not significantly increase legal certainty and
might even introduce uncertainty by encouraging indefinite claim
drafting practice. Establishing an objective test for applying the
doctrine, however, would increase legal certainty. As previously
discussed, the test which corresponds to the non-obviousness test

186. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684-85.
187. See generally Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605 (setting forth the "triple

identity test").
188. Bernhard Geissler, Comment on Formstein, 18 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 802, 803-05 (1987).
189. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608; Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 68485.
190. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(discussing what is included in the public domain).
191. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 (discussing the important factors to be
considered in determining equivalents).
192. Id.
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is objective and encourages innovation.'93 Moreover, the U.S.
courts could benefit from their own established case law regarding
patentability and validity.
Even before Hilton Davis, the difference between the German
central claiming principle and the United States "peripheral"
claiming principle was minimal. 94 The U.S. courts' adherence
to the peripheral claiming principle was reflected only in their strict
application of the "all elements" rule in literal infringement'95
and in their reluctance to find infringement via the doctrine of
equivalents determining that there was not a literal infringement of
the patent. The majority's argument that it did not expand the
literal scope, but found it substantially identical, 96 is artificial
and unpersuasive. The United States should admit its adherence to
the central claiming principle and restructure the theoretical
foundation of claim drafting and interpretation by reexamining the
relation between infringement and patentability.
2.

Limiting the Application of ProsecutionHistory Estoppel

The Hilton Davis majority properly rejected Warner-Jenkinson's
request to apply prosecution history estoppel and correctly affirmed
the finding that the process which operated below the claimed pH
range was equivalent to the process operating at the claimed
range.1 97 The majority refused to apply this doctrine because the
patentee's inclusion of the lower range limitation was unnecessary
to distinguish it from the cited prior art.' 98 The majority noted
that estoppel applies only to the extent necessary to maintain the
patentability of the claimed invention.' 99 The limitation imposed
by the majority is significant because it effectively merges the

193. See supra part III.B.1.
194. See ELLIS, supra note 169, at 3-4, 5-6 (discussing the evolution of the
principles of central and peripheral claiming).
195. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 949-50 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (Nies, J., dissenting) (discussing the "all elements" rule), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 961, and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
196. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1524-25.
197. Id. at 1528.
198. Id. at 1525.
199. Id.
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doctrine of prosecution history estoppel and the prior art limitation
doctrine into one, thereby rendering their once separate existence
to be meaningless.

The elimination of prosecution history estoppel will increase
legal certainty. Application of prosecution history estoppel both
increases uncertainty as well as frustrates the patent policy of
disseminating technical information in contravention of the wellaccepted belief that prosecution history estoppel limits the doctrine
of equivalents and thus increases legal certainty. 200 This is
evident because both the nature and purpose of prosecution history
estoppel are unclear. 2 1' This produces significant uncertainty in
determining the applicable scope of the estoppel doctrine, 2 and
has resulted in conflicting authority within the Federal Circuit.0 3
The more stringent viewpoint favors defendants and broadly
applies prosecution history estoppel to remove any possibility of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 204 Arguments and
amendments give rise to estoppel regardless of whether they are
necessary to overcome the prior art. 2 5 This grants a party more
opportunities to assert estoppel in order to bar the opposition's
application of the doctrine of equivalents.20 6 Although arguments
and amendments that clarify the claim language usually do not give

200. Kurt F. James, Comment, Patent Claims and Prosecution History
Estoppel in the Federal Circuit,53 Mo. L. REv. 497 (1988).
201. See 4 CHISUM, supra note 112, § 18.05[3] (1991); see also Donald S.
Chisum, Primer on Prosecution History Estoppel (Spring 1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Washington School of Law).
202. TAKENAKA, supra note 36, at 134.
203. See 4 CHISUM, supra note 112, § 18.05 (1991).
204. See, e.g., Prodyne Enters. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (declining to speculate on the necessity of a claim limitation for
overcoming prior art in determining the applicability of prosecution history
estoppel).
205. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985) (upholding the application of prosecution history
estoppel without considering the necessity of an amendment to overcome prior
art).
206. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1564
n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that estoppel may still apply even when the examiner
indicates that the claims in suit were allowable), cert. dismissed, 499 U.S. 955
(1991).

1996]

DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS AFTER HILTON DA VIS

511

rise to estoppel, °7 they are often indistinguishable from those
made for overcoming the prior art." 8 This distinction among
acts giving rise to estoppel lacks clarity and introduces significant

uncertainty to infringement results when accused infringers request
application of prosecution history estoppel. °9
Furthermore, extensive use of prosecution history estoppel may
tend to discourage applicants from clearly defining the invention
over the prior art and explaining its advantage in sufficient detail.
When applying the estoppel doctrine, the courts often decline to
find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents when the
replaced element in the accused product does not have exactly the
same features and does not create the same advantage. 21° To
avoid this disadvantageous result, U.S. applicants tend to avoid
amendments which clearly distinguish prior art and a discussion of
the advantages. This frustrates the patent goal of disseminating
technical information via patent disclosure.2 '
Even worse, patent application amendments and concerns about

207. Moeller v. lonetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 659-60 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding
that an examiner's amendment, for the purpose of "pointing out" the invention,
did not give rise to estoppel as a matter of law).
208. See Hi-Life Prods., Inc. v. American Nat'l Water-Mattress Corp., 842
F.2d 323 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In Hi-Life, the majority found summary judgment on
the issue of estoppel to be inappropriate because the amended claims did not
render the subject patentable. Id. at 326. The dissent, however, pointed out a
statement by the examiner indicating that the limitation in the claim rendered it
patentable. Id. at 326-27 (Davis, J., dissenting).
209. James, supra note 200, at 512-13 (discussing the uncertainty introduced
by the application of prosecution history estoppel).
210. See Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 954-55 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (holding that the district court did not err in its judgment of non-infringement).
211. In 1948, Judge Learned Hand remarked about the tension involved in
patent drafting:
On the one hand, if he confines himself rigidly to those elements as
they appear in the specifications, he deprives the patent of any practical
value, because it is always, or almost always, possible to change the
form of these as they appear, and yet cull the full advantage of the
discovery. On the other hand, if he too much abandons the elements as
they are disclosed, he will not "particularly point out ...

the part ...

or combination which he claims."
Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 693 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 825 (1948) (omission in original).
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foreign applications may give rise to prosecution history estoppel

with respect to the corresponding U.S. patents.21 2 To avoid this
disadvantage, U.S. attorneys are often reluctant to clarify the
invention over the prior art in other jurisdictions. As a result, the
U.S. patent system forces foreign patent systems to introduce
unreasonable practices such as insufficient clarification of the
distinguishable feature and advantage of the invention over the
prior art.
On the other hand, the more liberal viewpoint favors patentees
by allowing alterations of the claim during prosecution without
necessarily surrendering those changes to application of prosecution
history estoppel.21 3 Under this viewpoint, the doctrines of both
prosecution history estoppel and equivalents are weighed by the
courts in an equitable, balancing manner.2 4 Prior to Hilton
Davis, the Federal Circuit had begun to apply the more stringent
approach whereby the court found that the claims were altered to
avoid unpatentability under prior art.215 The Hilton Davis majority applied the doctrine of equivalents, notwithstanding the doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel, and returned to the more liberal
stance.216
The Hilton Davis majority went further than the existing case
law and clarified the scope of what is reserved for the patentee
under the doctrine of equivalents. 21 7 Although case law adhering
to the liberal view required courts to determine the scope of the
doctrine of equivalents or of estoppel, no case expressly indicated

212. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A., 714 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (stating that representations made to foreign patent offices may be
considered in determining the applicability of estoppel).
213. Black & Decker v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (explaining that claim amendments do not necessarily preclude the
application of prosecution history estoppel).
214. Id.; Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
215. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 867-68 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(holding that prosecution history estoppel is applicable when the patentee
specifically limited the scope of his claims to a certain number of memory chips
in order to overcome prior art).
216. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1528.
217. Id. at 1522-24.
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how to determine that scope.2 8 The Hilton Davis majority
permitted application of the doctrine of equivalents and reclamation
of the pH range surrendered during prosecution by reasoning that
the lower range limitation was not included in order to distinguish
the cited prior art.21 9 The majority reasoned that prosecution
history estoppel only limits the doctrine of equivalents to the extent
necessary to distinguish the prior art. 220° This view negates the
necessity for the estoppel doctrine because prosecution history
estoppel becomes truly important only if the prior art does not
To permit prosecution history
preclude the accused device.
estoppel to co-exist with the range of what is limited by the prior
art, the Hilton Davis majority merged prosecution history estoppel
with the prior art limitation doctrine and removed the uncertainty
and unfavorable practice resulting from prosecution history
estoppel.
C.

The Substantial Difference Test Should Be Decided by
Judges

In tackling the final question, the Hilton Davis majority simply
cited Graver Tank and declared that the jury must decide infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 22' The doctrine originates from common law, and its application relates to the issues of
fact. 222 The court's analysis is grossly oversimplified and does
not consider the historical reality that patent infringement issues-both the legal and the equitable questions--were decided by courts
of equity.
The majority's conclusion is in stark contrast to the decision in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,223 where the Federal
Circuit also decided en banc that judges must decide the meaning
of the literal claim.224 The Supreme Court has affirmed Mark-

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

E.g., Black & Decker, 886 F.2d at 1294; Loctite, 781 F.2d at 871.
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520.
Id.
Id. at 1518.
Id. at 1520.

223. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
224. Id. at 970-71.
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man and the Federal Circuit's determination regarding the respective roles of the judge and jury in interpreting a patent claim.225
Under U.S. patent law, defining the meaning of claim language
is distinctly different from applying the claim language to the
226
accused device in order to find literal and substantial identity.
Thus, in theory, it is not unreasonable for each step to be decided
by a different entity. In practice, however, the two steps are
inseparable because judges usually define the claim language with
the accused products in mind. A court can clearly define a claim
in terms of whether it departs from, or is identical to, an accused
product. This process allows a judge to resolve any material
factual issues for the jury, which will then decide the literal and
substantial identity of both the claim and the accused product.
However, because most trial judges do not have particular training
in either patent or technology law, they may be reluctant to resolve
these issues.227 The Federal Circuit judges, however, are given
the power to review these issue de novo, and they should take
228
advantage of their special knowledge of these areas of law.
This could significantly reduce the likelihood that infringement
would be decided under the doctrine of equivalents.
Even when infringement is decided under the doctrine of
equivalents, the jury should not be asked to determine whether the
claimed invention and the accused product are substantially
different. 229 Judge Nies correctly observed that the issue of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a legal issue
based on findings concerning factual issues.230 Juries must be
given more detailed instructions regarding such factual issues.

225. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
226. For a general discussion of the steps for determining infringement, see
CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 126, § 2F.
227. Congress has given the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over patent appeals
because its judges are familiar with patent technology. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).
228. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 501 (1984) (stating that an "appellate court has the power to correct
errors of law, including those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and
fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing
rule of law.").

229. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1579 (Nies, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
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Because the substantial difference test is comparable to the nonobviousness test, the former test raises a question of law similar to
the non-obviousness issues and should be decided by judges."'
Patentability and infringement determinations are interrelated and
should be decided in the same manner. This is particularly true in
the United States where both issues are decided by the same court
in an infringement action.232
The respective roles of the judge and jury in determining nonobviousness are clear and undisputed. To promote consistency and
certainty, the doctrine of equivalents should be treated in a similar
fashion. For example, to find a substantial difference, courts will
consider whether one skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability between the claimed element and the replaced
element at the time of infringement. 33 The jury must decide
when infringement began and to what degree of knowledge one is
skilled in the art.234 To determine whether there is a substantial

identity, judges must decide, based on these facts, whether the
interchangeability was known. In addition, they must determine if
the claimed invention and the accused product both function in
substantially the same way to produce the same result.235
In Markman, the Supreme Court found that a historical analysis
was not helpful to determine whether a judge or a jury should
ascertain a claim's meaning.236 The Court, however, considered
"both the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the
'
statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation."237
Both functionality and policy considerations favor judges over
juries to decide the substantial identity under the doctrine of

231. See Julie Research Lab., Inc. v. Guildline Instruments, Inc., 501 F.2d
1131, 1135-36 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that the non-obviousness test is ultimately
a question of law).
232. German infringement courts cannot decide the validity of literal claim
scope because the Federal Patent Court has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the
literal scope validity. "Fixing Device" (Befestigungsvorrichtung), 19 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 243, 244 (1988) (BGH 1986).
233. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1578 (Nies, J., dissenting).
236. Markinan, 116 S. Ct. at 1389-93.
237. Id. at 1393-96.
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equivalents because judges are more likely to give proper determinations on the factors than juries are, and there is a policy concern
that there is a need for uniformity in the treatment of a given
patent, which applies equally to both claim interpretation and
determination under the doctrine of equivalents.238
IV.

PROPOSAL:

DYNAMIC INVENTION SCOPE THEORY

In her concurring opinion, Judge Newman urged both legal and
industry professionals to propose a statutory procedure through
which patentees

can protect their continuing work.239

The

doctrine of equivalents will have that same effect if the restated
substantial difference test is similar to the non-obviousness test.
Judge Newman, however, wished to legalize formally the doctrine
because she believes uncertainty is introduced by the doctrine.240
Eliminating the doctrine of equivalents, however, cannot completely remove uncertainty; instead, the doctrine increases certainty once
an objective test is established.24 ' Consequently, the U.S. patent
system does not need another procedure to replace the doctrine.
Judge Newman highlighted the important fact that the meaning
of the claim changes as the technology progresses.242 . In the most
advanced fields of technology, a pioneer invention can break
through a major technological barrier and, in a short period of time,
introduce variations and improvements which raise the state of
art.243 This rapidly changes the meaning of the claim language.
For example, development in the variety of materials in semiconductor, or integrated circuit, technology quickly changed the
meaning of such terms as "semiconductor," "conductor," and
"insulator." 2
Similarly, the insulation between the electronic
238. Id.
239. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1536 (Newman, J., concurring). For instance,
Judge Newman considered a statutory form called the "patent of addition" where
additional disclosure and claims can be added to a patent after it has been issued.
Id. at 1536 n.4 (Newman, J., concurring).
240. Id.at 1534-36 (Newman, J., concurring).
241. See supra part III.A.3.
242. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1530 (Newman, J.,
concurring).
243. Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
244. Fujitsu v. TI, Judgment of Tokyo Trial Court, Aug. 31, 1994, Hanrei Jiho
(No. 1510) 35, Hanrei Taimuzu (No. 862) 108 (1995). In this case, the Tokyo
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elements of the basic Kilby invention has now been replaced with
When a competitor
a more advanced type of insulation.245
replaces material or insulation based on technology which is
obvious to one skilled in the art at the time of the replacement, it
really represents copying and not substantial innovation."4 To
prevent this copying, the patent should be interpreted to cover such
obvious replacements, regardless of whether the inventor anticipated such developments and drafted claims to cover the replacement.247 Otherwise, pioneer inventors would not be fairly rewarded. Most pioneer inventions are not commercially successful
and cannot be compensated unless extension to commercially
successful improvements is available.
Some propose that the scope of the pioneer invention be limited
to the scope enabled by the inventor.24' This makes it impossible
to protect a patentee's future works. Because enablement is
decided on the application date and the scope is limited, the
coverage of future obvious variations would be excluded. Other
scholars, in addition to Judge Nies, suggest that patentees who fail
to cover variations adopted by competitors should resort to the
reissue procedure.249
This proposal, however, does not work because enlarging the
scope by means of the reissue procedure is also limited by the

District Court rejected the literal coverage of a pioneer invention for manufacturing integrated circuits. This included the modifications resulting from the later
technological development. The court stated that there was no suggestion of the
modification written in the disclosure. For a discussion of this case, see Terril G.
Lewis, Comment, SemiconductorChip ProcessProtection,32 HOUs. L. REV. 555,
594-98 (1995).
245. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805
F.2d 1558, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (acknowledging this breakthrough in
technology).
246. Id. at 1563.
247. Judge Newman noted that the speed and ease of imitation favors a rule
that tempers the rigors of literal claim interpretation. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at

1530 (Newman, J., concurring).
248. Merges & Nelson, supra note 174, at 860-62 (discussing the reverse
doctrine of equivalents in order to limit the scope of the original patent).
249. Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in
PatentLaw: Questions that Pennwalt DidNot Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673,
715-29 (1989).
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scope in the specification on the application date and cannot be
used to cover later developed variations.2 50 An important fact
that these arguments fail to note is the purpose of both patent
validity determination in an infringement action and the reissue
procedures which correct the mistakes arising out of the examination at the Patent Office. This procedure only takes into account
the state of the art on the date of the invention or application when
the Patent Office examined the claim, which does not take future
technology into account.25 '
By using the same requirement that is used for patentability, the
doctrine of equivalents effectively protects the inventor's further
developments because obvious works are protected by the basic
patent, and nonobvious works are protected by separate patents. It
is possible for claim interpretation to be based on the dynamic
invention scope theory that views invention scope as consisting of
the claimed invention and its equivalents that are obvious to one
skilled in the art on the invention date and thereby expands to
include obvious equivalents as the technology progresses.252 In
this scheme, the Patent Office is responsible for making sure that
the claimed invention does not override any other invention's scope
of existing technology on the invention date. The infringement
courts are responsible for examining whether the defendant's
embodiment overrides any invention concept existing on the
infringement date. In the United States, infringement courts are
also responsible for correcting any errors made by the Patent Office
in its examination of validity issues in an infringement action.
The dynamic invention scope theory originates from the practical
view that accused products or processes are later developments by
defendants, and that patentees can claim protection under the
doctrine of equivalents for what they could have claimed had they

250. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1536 (noting that the reissue period does not
allow adding to the disclosure) (Newman, J., concurring).
251. Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
252. See generally Gregory J. Smith, The Federal Circuit'sModern Doctrine
of Equivalents in Patent Infringement, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 916 (1989)
(stating that every inventor should be entitled to a fair, common sense assessment
of the invention's scope).
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known of the future accused products or processes." 3 The
underlying policy of this theory is to protect only those creations
which qualify for a patent. The practice in the United States prior
to Hilton Davis was impractical and encouraged competitors to take
advantage of the literalism of claim drafting; it required inventors
to know about existing technology and possible future variations,
as well as required inventors to draft claims to cover them.254 By
deciding to apply, as of the time of infringement, the doctrine of
equivalents using the substantial difference test in a manner
comparable to the non-obviousness test, the Hilton Davis majority
provided the procedure that Judge Newman has requested.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the Hilton Davis majority surprised U.S. patent
practitioners and legal scholars who are familiar with the peripheral
claiming principle, the decision will be welcomed by other
jurisdictions because it adopted many aspects of the central
claiming principle. The revival of the test in Graver Tank resulted
in the merging of the patentability test with the infringement
test. 5 This moved U.S. patent claim interpretation closer to that
of many other jurisdictions and increased its legal certainty.256
Affirmation of in-principle application of the doctrine of equivalents and limiting prosecution history estoppel to the extent
necessary to overcome the prior art will also significantly contribute to ensuring legal certainty and harmonizing U.S. patent law
with that of other jurisdictions. 7 Although there are points that
the Hilton Davis majority did not clarify and which may cause
some confusion in the future,258 the substantial difference test is
more beneficial than the subjective three-part identity test. The
Federal Circuit appears to be about to adopt the theory of restructuring claim interpretation under the central claiming principle.
253. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
254. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1530-31 (Newman, J., concurring).
255. See supra part III.A.2.
256. See supra part III.A. 1.
257. See supra part III.B.
258. See supra part III.A.4.
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Once adopted, U.S. patent claim interpretation will be complete
with respect to the patent policies of both encouraging innovation

and disseminating technical information through the discovery of
patented inventions.

